All of our eggs in one basket?

The Future of US ICBM Force

Courtesy of Defpro.com

Global Strike Command Assumes Deterrent Missions

09:12 GMT, December 4, 2009 On 1 December 2009, the new US Air Force Global Strike Command formally assumed nuclear deterrence missions with land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The Command assumed command and responsibility for 20th Air Force and its three missile wings located at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming; at Maelstrom Air Force Base in Montana; at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota; as well as the 576th Flight Test Squadron at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The Command will later take over the B-52 and B-2 bombers as well.

The Global Strike Command’s Commander, Lt.Gen. Frank G. Klotz described the Command’s responsibilities and roles in a recent speech at the Air Force Association (AFA) Global Warfare Symposium. Excerpts follow.

The US Air Force’s newest major command, Air Force Global Strike Command, will very shortly assume responsibility for the nation’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, and then a little bit later in the new year the long range nuclear capable bombers. As we do so, we will become ardent champions for both weapon systems as well as for the women and men who operate, maintain, secure and support them.

Both the ICBM and the bomber legs of the strategic nuclear triad have been and most importantly remain essential and indispensable components of our nation’s armed forces. Each makes important and each makes unique contributions to the security of our nation, as well as that of our allies and our friends. I’d like to focus my comments on the current status and the future of the ICBM force.

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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Propulsion – From GlobalSecurity.org

The F135 engine development program has experienced cost growth since the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) program began in fiscal year 2002. At the beginning of EMD in fiscal year 2002, the F135 engine development program was expected to cost $4.828 billion in then-year dollars. The F–35 program manager reported that as of the end of 2008, development costs have grown to $6.7 billion in then-year dollars, an increase of $1.872 billion, or 38 percent. Additionally, the committee notes that the F–35 program manager has reported an increase of approximately 38 to 43 percent in F135 engine procurement cost estimates between December 2005 and December 2008, in the annual selected acquisition reports for the F–35C and F–35A variants. Between December 2005 and December 2008, engine procurement cost estimates for the F–35B have grown approximately 47 percent, but the F–35B engine procurement cost growth is attributable to both the F135 engine and the F–35B’s lift fan.

Conversely, the F136 engine program has not experienced any cost growth since its inception. The F136 pre-EMD contract, which began in 2002 and was completed in 2004, was for $411.0 million and did not experience cost growth. The F136 EMD contract was awarded in 2005, and the cost estimate, at $2.486 billion, has been stable since contract award. Given the F135 development and procurement cost increases, the House Armed Services Committee stated in Juned 2009 that it was “perplexed” by the Department’s decisions over the past three years to not include an F–35 competitive propulsion system program in its budget requests.

Based on the F135 cost growth, F135 test failures noted in the committee report (H. Rept. 110–652) accompanying the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, and resultant schedule delays due to F135 engine test failures, the committee remained steadfast in its belief that the non-financial factors of a two-engine competitive program such as better engine performance, improved contractor responsiveness, a more robust industrial base, increased engine reliability and improved operational readiness, strongly favor continuing the F–35 competitive propulsion system program.

Related Link> F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
CRS Report for Congress

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Half a Ton of Uranium, and a Long Flight – This is the story of Project Sapphire

On a snowy day in December 1993, just months after Andy Weber began his diplomatic job at the U.S. Embassy in Almaty, Kazakhstan, he met with a tall, bullet-headed man he knew only as Col. Korbator.

“Andy, let’s take a walk,” the colonel said. As they strolled through a dim apartment courtyard, Korbator handed Weber a piece of paper. Weber unfolded it. On the paper was written:

U235

90 percent

600 kilos

Weber did the calculation: 1,322 pounds of highly enriched uranium, enough to make about 24 nuclear bombs. He closed the note, put it in his pocket and thanked the colonel. After several months of patient cultivation of his contacts, Weber finally had the answer he had been seeking.

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